We consider generalizations of the Gale-Shapley (1962) Stable Marriage Problem to threesided families. Alkan (1988) gave an example which shows that in the case of general preferences stable matchings do not always exist. Here we suggest a more compact example. Danilov (2001) proved that stable matchings exist for some acyclic preferences and he raised the problem for the lexicographical-cyclic preferences. Here we show that the answer is negative. We construct a three-sided system with lexicographical-cyclic preferences for which no stable matching exists.
Introduction

Lexicographical-Cyclic Preferences
A preference is called lexicographical-cyclic, or lexcyclic for short, if
, and similar for the women and cats. In other words the men first care about the women and then the cats, the women first care about the cats and then the men, and the cats first care about the men and then the women. We show that for n = 1, 2 there always exists a stable matching and for each n ≥ 3 there exists a lexcyclic preference order that does not admit a stable matching.
The fact that for n = 1, 2 there is always a stable matching comes from Lemma 2, which shows that for the cyclic preference case there is always a stable matching for n = 1, 2, and from Lemma 3, which shows that if for some n there exists a lexcyclic preference that does not admit a stable matching then for the same n there exists a cyclic preference that does not admit a stable matching. Proof: There are (3!) 2 = 36 possible matchings. We will show that for each one a breaking triple exists. Given a matching M such that (m 2 , w 2 , c 2 ) / ∈ M and (m 1 , w i , c 2 ) / ∈ M for i = 1, 2, 3, then it is clear that (m 2 , w 2 , c 2 ) is a breaking triple. Thus this triple breaks 20 matchings. Further, let us note that each one of the next 9 matchings is broken by a unique triple as follows:
Finally let us observe that the above nine triples break also the remaining 7 matchings:
Thus all 36 matchings are broken. Obviously, the obtained 10 triples form a unique minimum breaking set.
Lemma 1 If for some n there exists a lexicographical-cyclic preference list that does not admit a stable matching, then there exists a lexicographical-cyclic preference list for n+1 that does not admit a stable matching.
Pf: Suppose P is a lexicographical-cyclic preference list that does not admit a stable matching for n men, n women, and n cats. First, we introduce m n+1 , w n+1 , c n+1 into the original n men's, n women's, and n cats' preference orderings such that P (m i ) (w n+1 , c n+1 ) = P (w i ) (m n+1 , c n+1 ) = P (c i ) (m n+1 , w n+1 ) = n + 1 ∀i ≤ n. Second, we let P (m n+1 ) (w n+1 , c n+1 ) = P (w n+1 ) (m n+1 , c n+1 ) = P (c n+1 ) (m n+1 , w n+1 ) = 1. Clearly we can do this and ensure that our new preference order is still lexcyclic. Suppose M is a matching of these n + 1 men, women, and cats, and that (m n+1 , w n+1 , c n+1 ) ∈ M. Clearly we can remove all pairs involving m n+1 , w n+1 , c n+1 from the new preference lists and reduce this to the case of n men, n women, and n cats. Therefore, M is unstable by our inductive hypothesis. Suppose (m n+1 , w n+1 , c n+1 ) / ∈ M. Then, (m n+1 , w n+1 , c n+1 ) is a breaking triple, and thus M is unstable. Therefore, the new preference order for n+1 men, n+1 women, and n+1 cats is unstable.
Hence, for every n ≥ 3 there exists a lexicographical-cyclic preference that does not admit a stable matching.
Cyclic Preferences
A preference is called cyclic if every man is given a preference order over the women, every woman is given a preference order over the cats, and every cat is given a preference order over the men. Given a matching M, suppose that (
∈ M and the following conditions hold:
In other words, a family F ∈ M is breaking for a matching M, if at least two of the members of F are "better off" with F (with respect to their own preferences) than with the families they belong to in M. A matching is called stable if no breaking triples exist. We show that for n = 1, 2 there is always a stable matching and that for n ≥ 3 there exists a cyclic preference that does not admit a stable matching.
Lemma 2 For n=1,2 every cyclic preference has a stable matching.
Pf: For n = 1 there is nothing to prove. Suppose n = 2. Either there exists a triple, say, (m 1 , w 1 , c 1 ), such that m 1 has w 1 as his first choice, w 1 has c 1 as her first choice and c 1 has m 1 as its first choice. Then M = {(m 1 , w 1 , c 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 , c 2 )} is stable matching, since it is clear that neither m 1 ,w 1 , or c 1 can be in a breaking triple. Otherwise we can give all men their first choices and all women their first choices, resulting in a stable matching.
Lemma 3
If there exists a lexicographical-cyclic preference list that does not admit a stable matching, then there exists a cyclic preference list that does not admit a stable matching.
Pf: Suppose that P is a lexcyclic preference list that does not admit a stable matching. It is clear that if we simply ignore the second member of each pair P can be considered as a cyclic preference list. Suppose we have a matching M and a breaking triple (m i , w j , c k ) for the lexcyclic case, (m i , w j , c k ) / ∈ M. Now suppose that (m i , w j , c k ) is not a breaking triple for the cyclic case, and w.l.o.g. assume that m i prefers w i to w j . Then clearly (m i , w j , c k ) can not be a breaking triple in the lexcyclic case, a contradiction. Hence, since every matching has such a breaking triple for the lexicographical-cyclic case, we are done.
Hence, since we know that for n ≥ 3 there exist a lexcyclic preference that does not admit a stable matching, the same holds for cyclic preferences.
